Why Did the U.S. Army Retreat at Kabul Despite Having Advanced Weapons?

The dramatic retreat of the U.S. Army from Kabul in 2021, despite possessing state-of-the-art weaponry, raises critical questions about the efficacy of modern military tactics in counter-insurgency contexts. This article delves into the strategic and tactical shortcomings of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan and explores why their advanced arsenal could not prevail over a guerrilla-type enemy.

Strategies and Tactics: Conventional vs. Guerrilla Warfare

Strategy and tactics are more important than weapons, yet the strategies employed by the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan were flawed from the outset. The failure to adapt to guerrilla warfare tactics ultimately led to their downfall. The initial punitive expedition of 2001 was necessary to expel Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but it was shortsighted to envision a long-term nation-building project without clear objectives or sustainability.

The Unlearning of Past Lessons

The U.S. made a grand display of its advanced weaponry during the conflict, particularly the MOAB (Mother of All Bombs). The intention was to decimate the Taliban and their insurgent allies. However, the outcome was a significant casualty among innocent civilians, further alienating the Afghan population. The U.S. and its allies learned little from this disastrous military operation as they continued to commit similar mistakes.

Fighting for Freedom vs. Fighting for Control

The question remains: why did the U.S. and its allies engage in a seemingly unwinnable conflict? The answer lies in the fundamental misunderstanding of the cultural and national identity of Afghanistan. The U.S. went to Afghanistan to destroy Al-Qaeda, not to build a nation. The initial punitive actions in 2001 were indeed correct, but the lack of a clear exit strategy led to a prolonged and ultimately fruitless intervention.

The Failure of Nation Building and the Adaptive Taliban

It is important to note that Afghanistan has no real economic, mineral, or strategic value and remains largely a tribal, lawless place. The U.S. and NATO had no strategic interest in the country beyond the threat posed by Al-Qaeda. The Taliban's ability to adapt and regroup, waiting for the international forces to leave, proved to be a masterful strategy. The insurgents were biding their time, and their perseverance paid off in the end.

Role of the Afghan Government

The Afghan government's failure to satisfy its people is a critical factor in the U.S. military's retreat. The Afghan government proved to be corrupt, indifferent, and incapable of effectively leading the country. The U.S. had invested heavily in training Afghan forces and providing them with equipment, but the corrupt leadership undermined these efforts. Soldiers within the Afghan military surrendered to the Taliban for bribes, and entire regiments surrendered without fighting, revealing a deep lack of morale and national identity among the Afghan forces.

Lessons from History

Comparing the Afghanistan conflict to the Vietnam War reveals striking parallels. In both cases, the U.S. had access to superior weaponry and resources but could not overcome a motivated and adaptive enemy. The U.S. made the critical mistake of trying to nation-build in a culture that was fundamentally opposed to its concepts of democracy and freedom. Instead of leaving Afghanistan as soon as its immediate objectives were met, the U.S. overstayed its welcome, leading to a rapid deterioration of its position.

Conclusion

The U.S. Army's retreat from Kabul in 2021 is a sobering reminder of the challenges in counter-insurgency warfare. Advanced weapons can overwhelm conventional forces, but they are no match for a determined and adaptable guerrilla enemy. The lessons from the Afghanistan conflict are clear: nations must be wary of long-term commitments, understand the cultural and political landscape, and recognize the limits of state-building in regions where local forces are deeply resistant to change.